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volume is a welcome attempt to combine extremely disparate regional
.l literature on structural adjustment programs. The empirical research for the
book was conducted in such a way as to generate truly economic hypotheses and
conclusions. Bates and Krueger commissioned eight teams of researchers; each
composed of at least one political scientist and an economist. The teams' initial
agenda was to unravel the puzzle of why good economics means bad politics in
relation to these structural adjustment programs. To meet that end, the teams were
asked to investigate three phases surrounding the adjustment programs: Informed by
current theories of interest groups, rent extraction, and bureaucracies, these analysts
explored the political and economic background of the period prior to the reform
process itself, and the political and economic reactions to adjustment. Included in
the volume are the standard cases of stabilization and adjustment (Ghana, Zambia,
Brazil), yet case selection is varied, resulting in fascinating studies of Turkey, Ecuador, and Egypt. In considering these less studied countries, the volume adds a wealth
of monographic data to its theoretical agenda.
Comparativists will find much of note in the
country studies that constitute the core of the
book. From Grindle and 'lboumi's description
of politically fragile F.cuadorian presidents muddling through adjustment to Leith and Lofchie 'sand Stalling and Brock's explorations of the
power of economic ideas in Ghana and Chile,
the volume's eight cases reflect the political richness of economic reform in the developing
world. Most lead us to conclude that societal
interests and external actors are relatively ineffectual in bringing about and sustaining economic reform. The country teams, for example, find
little evidence to suggest that in periods of economic crisis negatively impacted interest groups
are able to pressure leaders to embark on politically risky programs of reform. As the editors
note in their conclusion, the impetus in both
cases appears to emerge almost entirely from
the executive branch of government.
Many of these cases (Ecuador and Egypt,
for example) also support the work of Haggard,
Kaufman, and Remmer, which in recent years
has cast doubt on the ability of regime type to
account for the success or failure of particular
episodes of adjustment. Of greater significance
is the ease in which contributors move beyond
this increasingly stale debate to focus more on
the role that institutions play in the reform process. Just as adjustment leads to the modifica-

tion of existing economic structures, a similar
process appears to occur in the political realm.
In Turkey and Chile, economic restructuring led
to the increased insulation of technocrats; in
Zambia, political imperatives forced the locus
of economic policy-making to oscillate between
government ministries and party committees
during adjustment. Reform may not require
authoritarianism, but the process does seem to
infuse energy in the executive.
Most of volume's contributors adhere to the
editors' initial framework, although Holt and
Roe's treatment of the Egyptian case is a notable exception. Their focus on the agricultural
sector comes at the expense of both the editors'
agenda and a serious discussion of the future of
economic reform in the country. We also remain somewhat puzzled by the inclusion of
Korea in the project, despite the editors' discussion of the theoretical and practical considerations that motivated their case selection.
Korea's restructuring in the early 1960s differs
fundamentally from the episodes of reform covered in the other cases, most of which are informed by the notion of policy-based lending
developed by the World Bank during the 1980s.
Practical issues aside, recent episodes of reform
in Thailand or the Philippines might have been
better suited for a work of this nature.
Please tum to page 17, column 1
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The volume's contributors succeed in challenging with empirical evidence many of the
stylized facts that continue to drive the study of
economic reform in the developing world. At a
fundamental level the book contributes to our
stock of case knowledge on structural adjustment. But it also manages to rise above much
of the existing literature. Bates and Krueger'
effort fits most comfortably with recent cross-

regional work on adjustment by Nelson, Haggard and Kaufman, and Perkins and Roemer.
As with these collections, the present volume
harnesses the power of ideography in the search
of simple, testable hypotheses about the interaction of politics and economics during periods
of reform. It deserves a wide audience among
those interested in the political economy of development.

Joireman and
Wells (cont. from
page 10)

------------------------------------------------------------------ - - - -

